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Portugal's Accession and Integration Into
the European Economic Community
NANCY WEINGARDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
March 29, 1985 marked the end of eight years of arduous negotia-
tions over the terms of Portugal's admission into the European Economic
Community (E.E.C.)' The accession treaty culminating from these negoti-
ations was signed by Portugal on July 11, 1985, and ratified by the E.E.C.
member countries later that same year. On January 1, 1986 Portugal fi-
nally became a full member of the Community.
For the Community, Portugal's admission symbolizes significant sup-
port of the new Portuguese democracy which will ultimately further the
E.E.C.'s goal to strengthen peace and liberty throughout Western Europe.
For the Portuguese, admission signifies not only support for their democ-
racy, but also the official end of centuries of economic, political, and so-
cial isolation from the rest of Europe. According to former Portuguese
Prime Minister Mario Soares (1976-1978), "everything will change."2
This paper focuses on the problems and benefits that Portugal's
membership will pose to both the Community and Portugal. Special con-
sideration is given to Portugal's unique political and economic history
and its place in a unified European system. A review is also given of fu-
ture developments in Portugal's industry, Portugal's wine trade with the
United States, and the E.E.C.'s textile trade with third-world countries.
* Nancy Weingardt was the recipient of the Leonard v.B. Sutton award for 1986. Ms.
Weingardt received her J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law in 1986.
1. What is known today as the E.E.C. began in 1951 with the creation of the first of the
three communities, comprising the E.E.C., the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). Member nations were West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the
Netherlands. Its success encouraged the original six to apply the same approach to the en-
tire European economy. Two treaties creating the remaining communities, the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed
in Rome in 1957. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined. In 1981,
Greece was admitted. With the addition of Portugal and Spain in 1986, the Community of
Twelve encompasses most of Western Europe. See generally The European Community,
Eua. 27-30 (July-Aug. 1985) (hereinafter cited as The European Community). In this paper
the acronyms: the E.E.C., the Community, and the Common Market all refer to the Euro-
pean Economic Community in its entirety.
2. Schumacher, For Spain and Portugal, Isolation is About to End, N.Y. Times, July 8,
1985, at 12, col. 3 (hereinafter cited as Schumacher).
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II. PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY AND UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
A. Portugal's Isolation from the Rest of Western Europe
Portugal is by far the poorest and least developed country in West-
ern Europe. The country's gross domestic product is only about one-
fourth of that of the E.E.C. average.' It is classified as semi-industrial-
ized, as compared with the majority of Western European countries
which are fully industrialized." It also trails Western Europe in literacy
and education, as well as a higher infant mortality rate.3 Some sixty-eight
percent of the populace still lives in rural villages." Wooden-wheeled carts
are common in the countryside, and appropriately so, considering the fact
that the country has very few roads suitable for automobiles. 7 Basically,
Portugal's development is comparable to that of France and Italy in the
1950's, and Spain in the 1960's.8
This lapse is due largely to Portugal's isolation from the rest of Eu-
rope. The Portuguese have historically searched out their fortunes from
the sea. They were the first white men to follow the African coast around
the Cape of Good Hope and then to cross the Indian Ocean to China and
Japan. They established colonies in the Far East, Africa, and South
America. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Portugal was Eu-
rope's richest nation.'
Although the colonies brought the Portuguese fantastic wealth, they
also brought dangerous illusions. Portugal's kings squandered fortunes on
extravagances and disabling wars.10 They refused to join the Enlighten-
ment of other European political and social movements."
Portugal's dictator from 1928 through 1968, Antonio de Oliviera
Salazar, made every attempt to freeze what remained of Portugal's em-
pire. Opposed to all forms of internationalism, Salazar kept the Portu-
guese economy almost entirely dependent on the colonies until the mid-
3. In 1981, Portugal's gross domestic product was 24.4 percent of the Community
average.
4. See R. MORRISON, PORTUGAL: A REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 168
(1981)(hereinafter cited as R. MORRISON); THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: THE
INTEGRATION OF UNEQUAL PARTNERS 246, 254 (D. Seers and C. Vaitos ed. 1982)(hereinafter
cited as THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C.); Redston, The Impact of E.C. Member-
ship on Portugal and Spain, INTERECONOMICS, Sept.-Oct. 1983 at 207-208 (hereinafter cited
as Redston).
5. Bruneau, Discovering Democracy, WILSON Q. 67, 68 (Jan. 1985)(hereinafter cited as
Bruneau).
6. Id. at 78.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 78; Opinion on the Portuguese Applications for Membership, BULL. EUR.
COMM. 13 (Supp. May 1978)(hereinafter cited as Opinion on the Portuguese Applications
for Membership).
9. For an historical account see Maxwell, Prisoners of Glory, WILSON Q. 49-66 (Jan.
1985)(hereinafter cited as Maxwell).
10. Id. at 55-62.
11. Id. at 58-59.
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1960's. Raw materials were obtained only from the colonies and any prod-
ucts which were unable to be sold elsewhere were unloaded in Africa."
In the 1950's, when West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Belgium, and the Netherlands were planning the creation of the E.E.C.,
Salazar and the Portuguese refused to acknowledge the grave social, polit-
ical, and economic devastations of World War II that made development
of new forms of European cooperation imperative.' 3
B. Demise of Portuguese Isolation
Not until the 1960's did it become apparent that Salazar's isolationist
economy would not last forever. In 1961, India seized Goa from a 3,500-
man Portuguese garrison that had been ordered to "conquer or die."' 4 In
Africa, as the French and British were "freeing" their colonies, uprisings
led by black nationalist guerrillas broke out in Portugal's colonies, e.g.
Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. Portugal poured its treasury, as well as
its military force, into its colonies in an attempt to stifle the uprisings.' 5
With half the governmental budget going to the military, Portugal's
rate of fixed investment was the lowestin Western Europe."0 The nation
was hit extremely hard by the global recession and inflation that followed
the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil em-
bargo.17 Consumer products' prices raced above wages and although both
unions and strikes were illegal in Portugal, disgruntled workers staged
some forty major walkouts.' s Plants owned by ITT and others were
forced to close down and resulting unrest grew in the military. On April
24, 1974, the successor government of Salazar Caetano was defeated in a
bloodless coup led by the military. 9
By March 1975, Portugal's colonies had been set free and ties with
the E.E.C. became increasingly important. The new Portuguese revolu-
tionary government expressed full acceptance of the 1972 agreements
with the E.E.C. 0 The E.E.C. began to play a role in internal Portuguese
politics by providing emergency assistance to Portugal, beginning in Oc-
tober of 1975, which included: emergency loans; long-term financial ar-
12. See generally id. at 62-66.
13. See THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 131 (J. Sampedro and J.
Payno ed.; L. Gorman and M. KilIjunen english ed. 1983)(hereinafter cited as THE ENLARGE-
MENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY).
14. Maxwell, supra note 9, at 64.
15. In 1968, Portugal had 130,000 troops deployed in Africa. Id. at 65.
16. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 68.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Independence was given to Guinea (Guinea-Bissau), Mozambique, and the islands
off Africa-the Cape Verde Islands, and Sao Tome and Principe. Timor (later seized by
Indonesia) declared its independence. China declined to take over Macao, the Portuguese
enclave near Hong Kong, and it remains today in Lisbon's hands. Portuguese troops with-
drew from Angola. Today all that remains of the Portuguese empire, besides Macao, are the
island provinces of Madeira and the Azores. Id. at 73.
20. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at 137.
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rangements; and a Financial Protocol." Such funds were conditioned on
Portugal following "the path of pluralistic democracy.".22 Portugal
achieved this goal on April 25, 1975 when elections for a constituent as-
sembly were held. Seventy-two percent of the vote went to pro-demo-
cratic parties.2"
The Portuguese adopted a constitution in 1976, which divided power
between a President, elected every five years, and an Assembly of the
Republic. In 1976 General Antonio Ramalho Eanes, was elected president
with 61.5 percent of the popular vote.24 This election, and resolute gov-
ernmental stability, led to application and admission into the E.E.C.
C. Application and Admission into the E.E.C.
On March 28, 1977, with their new democracy in place, the Portu-
guese formally applied for admission into the Community. Under the Pre-
amble to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
the signatory states proclaimed their resolution "to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty" and called "upon the other peoples of Eu-
rope who share their ideal to join in their efforts."25 Article 237 of this
treaty states that "[a]ny European State may apply to become a mem-
ber."26 Of course, this did not necessarily mean that all applicants would
be admitted. The E.E.C.'s primary concern in considering Portugal's ap-
plication was whether their admission would pose a threat to the preser-
vation of democracy in Europe.27
In the ensuing nine years of negotiations, the Portuguese proved
their commitment to democracy. Portugal had a succession of sixteen dif-
ferent coalition governments since 1974, which fully enjoyed Western
freedoms such as universal suffrage, freedom of religion and freedom of
the press.2 ' Portugal's admission into the E.E.C. brought expectations of
strength in democracy, 9 which would further the E.E.C.'s goal to pro-
mote peace and liberty throughout all of Europe.
21. Id. at 138.
22. See R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 144.
23. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 73.
24. Id. at 75.
25. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) paragraph 151 (March 25, 1957)(hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome), included
the countries of: West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and The Netherlands.
26. Id.
27. See Opinion on the Portuguese Application for Membership, supra note 8, at 1.
28. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 75.
29. See SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, EUR. REP. (No. 1119) 1 (Mar. 30,
1985)(hereinafter cited as SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT); see also Problems of En-
largement: Taking Stock and Proposals, BULL. EUR. COMM. (DE 46) 12 (Supp. Aug.
1982)(hereinafter cited as Problems of Enlargement); Opinion on the Portuguese Applica-
tion for Membership, supra note 8, at 1; see generally Dagtoglou, The Southern Enlarge-
ment of the European Community, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 149, 161 (1984)(hereinafter
cited as Dagtoglou).
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III. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
Portugal's economy was a main barrier to admission into the E.E.C.
The founders of the E.E.C. saw economic integration as a step to higher
degrees of military and political cooperation, leading into a possible
"United States of Europe", with the European Commission3" becoming a
transnational government, and permeating the emergence of the concept
of European citizenship.3 Today, however, the E.E.C. remains basically
an economic union. The E.E.C. has been successful to the extent of elimi-
nating tariffs and duties among member states, establishing a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and imposing a value-added tax (VAT). The
E.E.C. claims that in addition to this, some E.E.C. policies are gradually
replacing those of member states." No common defense policy has yet
emerged, although all of the member states, except Ireland and the two
acceding states,3 3 belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). There is not yet a central "European government," nor do citi-
zens of member states consider themselves first and foremost citizens of
Europe.
The seven years of negotiations leading to admission of Portugal into
the E.E.C. focused on the economic difficulties of integrating into the
E.E.C. a poor, semi-industrialized country with high unemployment, pro-
ducing products not generally favored by the E.E.C. 4 The main concerns
of the E.E.C. were integrating Portugal into the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), carrying forth the policy of free movement of workers, in-
creasing the E.E.C. budget, and the need to change E.E.C. decision mak-
ing processes.
A. Agricultural Policy
The E.E.C. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) plays a central role
in E.E.C. economic and social affairs. CAP accounts for two thirds of the
E.E.C.'s twenty billion dollar budget. 5 Goals of the CAP have never been
30. The Commission is made up of fourteen Commissioners appointed jointly by the
national governments. Commissioners act in the E.E.C. interests, independently of the
member-state governments, and are answerable only to the European Parliament. See
Treaty of Rome, supra note 25.
31. See generally THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 1-21.
32. The European Community, supra note 1, at 27-30.
33. Spain, as well as Portugal, acceded on Jan. 1, 1986.
34. SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29; Problems of Enlargement, supra
note 29; Opinion on the Portuguese Application for Membership, supra note 8; see gener-
ally THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 1-21, 243-66; The Enlarge-
ment of the European Community, EUR. FILE 1-7 (March 1979); Redston, supra note 4, at
207 -212.
35. The E.E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was fundamental to the birth of
the Community. The initial agreement sought to provide economic security for producers of
industrial goods and agricultural products. The answer was the "Europeanization" of the
support mechanisms being introduced in France-the guarantee of a price for what the
farmer could grow, backed up by protection at the external frontiers of the E.E.C. It corre-
sponded to the political need to give France a major vested interest in the creation of the
1987
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free trade in agriculture, but rather insuring a "fair standard of living for
the agricultural population, particularly by increasing the individual
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture." 36
The CAP is a policy of high prices for producers through guaranteed
prices and variable levees. Annual target prices are established by the
E.E.C. Council of Ministers. Producers are guaranteed this price, because
the E.E.C. will buy all the produce it is offered at slightly below the tar-
get price; that is, at an "intervention price". The cost of these subsidies is
becoming increasingly prohibitive." In order to maintain high prices,
cheaper import goods are discouraged from entering the market place
through a variable levy. This additional cost is set at levels insuring that
import goods will not undersell E.E.C. goods.
E.E.C. farmers are able to offer surplus goods into world markets at
competitive prices since the E.E.C. then refunds to the producer an
amount insuring a greater return than the cost of production.38
The addition of Portugal will further burden the E.E.C.'s agricultural
budget. The burden stems not so much from the fact that Portugal pro-
duces Mediterranean products, which are already posing surplus
problems within the E.E.C., but from the fact that Portugal will require
aid to modernize its agricultural sector.3 9 Small farms in northern Portu-
gal are neither competitive nor productive compared to other E.E.C.
countries. Large farms in southern Portugal are still recovering from the
nationalization after the revolution.4 Agriculture comprises only 14.9 per-
cent of the Portuguese gross domestic product.' The nation imports ap-
proximately half of its food, being self sufficient only in certain Mediter-
ranean products.'2
The cost of modernizing Portugal's agricultural sector may be offset
by imposing the principles of Community preference which would allow
the E.E.C.'s northern countries to sell more of their agricultural products
to the Portuguese. Portugal will have to open its markets to other Medi-
terranean products, thus benefiting other southern countries. Portugal
fears that this increased openness will threaten its own farmers.
The application of the CAP variable levy on imports from non-E.E.C.
Community of open markets, and the social requirement to make sure that the rapid indus-
trial modernization of Europe did not create prosperity which passed the peasant by. Farm
Policy is Fundamental to E.E.C., EUR. 36-37 (July-Aug. 1985).
36. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Agricultural
Policy, EUR. EcON. COMM. 24 (1982).
37. Id. at 36.
38. E.E.C., AuRIC. POL'Y EUR. COMM. (1979).
39. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at A1-A9.
40. Redston, supra note 4, at 208.
41. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at Al.
42. Food imports constitute one fifth of Portugal's total import bill. The country is self-
sufficient in the following products: 48 percent in wheat, 8 percent in sugar, 68 percent in
beef and veal and 100 percent only in wine, oil, fruits, and vegetables. See R. MORRISON,
supra note 4, at 153-54.
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countries will raise food costs in Portugal. In partial response to these
problems, the E.E.C. has agreed to allow the Portuguese to gradually re-
duce its import restrictions on E.E.C. agricultural products, and to
"phase-in" a variable levy after accession. 43 Even with these concessions,
the effect on Portuguese agriculture will be severe.
44
B. Free Movement of Workers
Although not as important as the CAP, the policy of free movement
of workers was fundamental to establishment of the E.E.C. Member
states are obliged to admit nationals of other member states who wish to
pursue specific economic activities and to treat them equally, giving them
protections and benefits, which their own nationals would be given. Even
though the Portuguese would certainly benefit if their workers were al-
lowed to migrate freely throughout the E.E.C., the host countries, who
already have enough trouble taking care of their own workers, 45 would
suffer.
As a result, freedom of movement of workers will be phased in gradu-
ally. Portuguese workers who already have jobs in other member coun-
tries will be entitled to the equal treatment from the host country, even if
they are unemployed at the time of accession. However, other Portuguese
workers will not be able to emigrate and seek employment for seven more
years.46
C. Community Budget
CAP, as well as other programs for increasing technological advance-
ment 47 , made it necessary to increase the Community budget before an
enlargement could be accomplished. 48 Preliminarily, the Community esti-
mates the addition of Spain as well as Portugal would result in a need to
increase the E.E.C. budget by approximately 15 to 20 percent. 9 Remit-
tances from the two countries were only expected to total 4 to 6 percent
of the increase.5 ° To make up the additional funds, the European Council
43. See generally SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 20-21 (This
provides a product by product schedule).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Dagtoglou, supra note 29, at 151.
46. See generally SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 22-24.
47. E.S.P.R.I.T., a ten-year $1 billion European program for research and development
in information technology is being implemented this year. See, E.S.P.R.I.T. Program is Un-
derway, EUR. 47 (March-April 1985).
48. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6; The E.E.C. revenue sources comprise
agricultural levies, customs duties, and 1 percent (up to 1.4 percent in 1986) of the VAT, the
consumer's tax, the consumer tax on goods and services collected in each of the member
states. The 1985 budget amounts to 30.556 ECU ($22.32 bill). See The European Commu-
nity, supra note 1, at 30.
49. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6.
50. Portugal will pay its share of its own resources in full but will be reimbursed on a
sliding scale until 1995. Portugal will receive some 1200 million ECO for 6 years. Id. at 7.
For details see SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 15.
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of the E.E.C.' adopted a proposal to increase the VAT to 1.4 percent, 0.4
percent over its 1 percent ceiling, which is now before the member states
for ratification." If this new tax is not adopted, E.E.C. experts predict
that harmonious economic development and access of all members to the
New Industrial Revolution will be impossible. 3
D. Decision Making
A semi-paralysis which has plagued the Community over the past
five years with respect to such projects as reform of the CAP, develop-
ment of internal markets, and instigation of common transport and envi-
ronmental policies is expected to be further complicated by the admission
of Portugal and Spain. 4 The unanimity of voting presently required by
the Community on this type of matter is expected to further paralyze the
Community's decision-making when the two developing countries which
manufacture products not favored by the Community become entitled to
vote. 5
Proposals have been made to remedy the conflict between the ex-
isting E.E.C. members and Portugal and Spain if they were to be admit-
ted. These include: use by the European Council of Article 155 of the
E.E.C. Treaty for developing executive powers in the Commission;" a
more systematic use of the vote by a qualified majority an extension of
majority voting in areas which now require unanimity; and reconstruction
of the entire institutional framework of the Community through a new
European Treaty of the Union which would encompass and supersede the
other Treaties. Under the Treaty of the Union, decision-making would
rest with the Parliament"' and the Council of the Union.' Deadlines
would then prevent decision-making from being delayed indefinitely in
either body. 9
Thus far, none of these proposals has been adopted, nor is it likely
51. The heads of government of member states and the President of the E.E.C. Com-
mission comprise the European Council which provides the main political guidance for the
Community. See generally The European Community, supra note 1, at 29-30.
52. SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 2.
53. Id.
54. See generally Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 7 (Enlargement will
compound deadlock); Dagtoglou, supra note 29 (Community's operational ability will be
diminished and it will no longer be able to speak with one voice); Wyles, Debate Heats Up
on the Community, EUR. 24 (Jan.-Feb. 1985)(hereinafter cited as Wyles)(Paralysis may be-
come total).
55. Id.
56. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 8.
57. At present, the European Parliament scrutinizes proposed Community laws through
its 15 specialized committees and acts as the E.E.C.'s public forum, debating issues of public
importance and questioning the Commission and Council. It also supervises the Commission
and has the power-never yet exercised-to dismiss it by a vote of censure. See generally
The European Community, supra note 1, at 29.
58. This is made up of representatives of the member countries' governments. Id.
59. See Dastoli, Parliament Has New Plan for European Union, EuR. 30-31 (Sept.-Oct.
1984).
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that any of them will be. Seven nations, excluding the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Greece favor such a move. These nations would also like to
see greater power extended to the European Parliament. The minority
three, while not directly opposed to such measure, are skeptical about the
desirability of abandoning the right of national veto in favor of majority
voting and of sharing legislative powers with the Parliament.6 The
"Dodge Committee", which is comprised of the personal representatives
of the Heads of Government working to reshape the E.E.C., suggests that
all issues covered by the Treaty of Rome be decided by majority voting."
For Portugal, adoption of these proposals would mean that it would
not have as much power in Community affairs. First, it would not have a
national veto, and second, Portugal would inevitably share a large share
of its national interests with other less-developed Mediterranean coun-
tries, which do not constitute a majority. 2
IV. PORTUGUESE INDUSTRY: WINDOW TO WESTERN EUROPE
A. Present State of Industry in Relation to that of the Community
The earnings, skill of workers, size of operations, diversification, in-
ternational competitiveness, and state of technology are lower in Portugal
than in any of the other E.E.C. countries. 3 Even large, efficient firms ca-
pable of competing in the Common Market have lower average productiv-
ity rates than other E.E.C. industries. This is true in most sectors of in-
dustry, excepting textiles and clothing, footwear, port wine, tomato paste,
and sardines.6 ' Without modernization, it is very unlikely that most of
the Portuguese industry will be able to withstand the increased competi-
tion from Community products.
As a member of the E.E.C., Portugal will have to dismantle all tariff
and non-tariff protections from Community industrial goods. To some
concerned, particularly the small businesses, increased competition from
the Community signifies the "holocaust and destruction of Portuguese in-
dustry," which has not yet completed the transition from a "supplier" to
its own colonies to an "independent competitor" in the world market. 5
60. See Wyles, supra note 54, at 24.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE E.E.C., supra note 4, at 254.
64. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Portugal,
FET 85-32 at 12 (Dep't Comm. April 1985).(hereinafter cited as Foreign Economic Trends:
Portugal)
65. Opposition comes mainly from small businessmen and owners of firms which rely
on protectionism for their survival and are too small to reap the benefits of economies of
scale. Statement by Pedro Ferraz da Costa, head of the Confederation of Portuguese Indus-
try. Schumacher, supra note 2, at 12, col. 6. See generally R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at
145-150
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B. Prospects for Investments: Window to Western Europe
Portugal is almost entirely dependent on the E.E.C. for technology.6
Portuguese growth in 1984 took place only in low-tech, labor intensive
industries such as footwear, machinery, metal products, wood and cork
products, textiles and clothing, and parts for electronic equipment.6 7
While the Community recognizes Portugal's need to become techno-
logically self-sufficient and to move out of traditional labor intensive in-
dustries,68 financial restrictions prevent the Community from helping
Portugal with the achievement of these goals.6 9 For the moment, it ap-
pears that Portugal's success in restructuring and modernizing its indus-
try will be highly dependent on their ability to attract non-E.E.C. invest-
ment and technology. Accession is expected to attract foreign investment
from non-E.E.C. countries who wish to establish a foothold in Commu-
nity Markets."0 However, these expectations are unfounded. With the ex-
ception of textiles and clothing, Portugal's basic industrial goods enter
the Community without restriction. Accession of Portugal into the E.E.C.
will not avail a non-E.E.C. company investing in Portugal any avenue
into Community markets which was not present prior to accession.7
Portugal is in a relatively accessible location to the E.E.C. market.
Although the Portuguese public is a relatively small market in which a
foreign firm may sell its products, any foreign investor will and has had
the entire E.E.C. market at its disposal. Additionally, Portugal has con-
tinued to strengthen its ties to its ex-colonies in Africa. 72 This may serve
as an added incentive to investors who wish to establish a foothold in
both the Community and in Africa.
Portugal does provide a relatively accessible market, however, the
willingness of non-E.E.C. firms to invest in Portugal will ultimately de-
pend on Portugal's: (1) foreign investment incentives; and (2) wage level
and adaptability of the work force.
66. With the exception of approximately twenty percent imported from the United
States, Sweden, and Switzerland, Portugal imports all of its technology from E.E.C. coun-
tries and Spain. See THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 13, at
173-75.
67. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 10-11.
68. See Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at 6,9-11; SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUP-
PLEMENT, supra note 29, at 24.
69. One author has suggested that a strategy of "leap-frogging" into high-tech areas be
applied to Portuguese industry. Under this approach the E.E.C. would avail Portugal much
needed technology under a common industrial policy. THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE
E.E.C., supra note 4, at 265. Problems of Enlargement, supra note 29, at A-12; see gener-
ally The Enlargement of the European Community, supra note 34, at 173. (The companies
with foreign participation are more productive and employ more workers than domestic
firms); Artisien & Buckley, Investment Legislation in Greece, Portugal, and Spain 7
J.W.T.L. 513, 517 (1983)(hereinafter cited as Artisien & Buckley).
70. Artisien & Buckley, supra note 69, at 517.
71. Id. at 514.
72. 1977 law (348/177); Id. at 518.
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1. Foreign Investment Legislation
Although Portugal's foreign investment legislation provides generous
tax exemptions and subsidies to foreign investors, it is highly complex
and lends itself to conflicting interpretations. Basically, under Portugal's
"general regime '73 foreign firms are entitled to all the incentives available
in Portuguese legislation without discrimination regarding the origin of
foreign capital. Foreign direct investment is permitted in all sectors ex-
cept those which are closed to private capital, foreign or domestic, and
these include: post and telecommunication, scheduled air and rail service,
and electricity. 4 Banking, insurance, cement, and fertilizers formerly con-
fined to the public sector, were opened to private investment in 1983.71
Steel making, petroleum refining, basic chemicals, and the arms industry
are open to private joint ventures.""
The state guarantees the transfer of dividends after deductions are
made for legal amortization and taxes. No restrictions exist on transfers
of capital arising from a sale or liquidation of a foreign investment, unless
there is a significant deterioration in the country's balance of payments
due to the withdrawal. In that case, capital repatriation may be spread
out over a period of up to five years.7 7 Additional incentives including tax
holidayss7 8 interest rate subsidies, and grants are available to certain in-
vestors under the "contractual regime. '79 These incentives are distributed
under a point system derived from the following criteria: economic per-
formance, sectorial priority, and regional priority.
Portugal's three ultimate goals in such an investment scheme are:
first, to encourage foreign investment in heavy industry which draws on
domestic supplies of raw materials, particularly iron ore, copper, lead and
zinc; second, to develop international competitiveness in traditional in-
dustries such as textiles; and third, to attract foreign investment in indus-
tries where Portugal already has a technological or other comparative ad-
vantage such as light electrical equipment, electronics and
telecommunication equipment.8 0
The Foreign Investment Institute operating under the authority of
the Minister of State for Finance and Planning, is entrusted with foreign
investment and technology transfer applications and is responsible for is-
suing authorization to foreign investors. According to the Foreign Invest-
73. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 12.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 9.
76. See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 69, at 513-523.
77. These include a fifty percent reduction on the following: conveyance tax on prop-
erty purchases, manufacturing and complementary taxes for up to nine years, value added
tax on gains from capital increases, capital gains tax on loan interest, and speedy write-offs
of property assets. Id.
78. This was provided under the 1980 System of Integrated Investment Incentives
(SIIC). Id.
79. Id.
80. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 13.
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ment Institute, approvals for foreign investment reached $191 million
dollars in 1984, an increase of thirty-one percent over 1983.81 Although
these figures appear promising, a closer look reveals that, of the total in-
flow, only twenty percent went to new enterprises, the type of investment
Portugal needs in order to restructure and diversify its technological mar-
ket. The remaining eighty percent went to increases in capital or expan-
sion of already existing facilities.8 2 Portugal's bureaucratic controls which
seem to scare off the new investors and favor the investors who are al-
ready present in the country are largely to blame.
In response to this problem Portuguese foreign investment legislation
is being extensively revised to facilitate investment procedures and to
make new investment more attractive. 3 Proposals include legislation sim-
ilar to that of Spain which contains fewer bureaucratic controls and
greater grants and loans to foreign investors. In Spain, foreign participa-
tion accounts for less than fifty percent of total investment and does not
require government authorization. Such a scheme has resulted in great
inflows of foreign capital into Spain over the past twenty years.8 4
Even though Portugal does not have the transport advantages, tech-
nologically sophisticated work force, and large domestic buying market of
Spain, legislation adopting the "fifty percent rule" would certainly be
beneficial to Portugal's foreign investment potential.8 5
2. Wage Levels and Adaptability of the Work Force
Portugal's wages are lower than any in the Community and resemble
more closely those of Mexico and Southwest Asia than those of other
Western European countries.86 Because much of Portugal's policy for in-
dustrialization is so linked with its low wages, the government has kept
salary levels low through a devaluation trend of the Portuguese escudo by
one-percent per month.8 7 Although this has worked to promote foreign
investment, it has also caused a steady increase in inflation. Real income
declined by four percent in 1982, seven percent in 1982, and ten percent
81. Investment from the E.E.C., led by France with twelve percent and the United
Kingdom with ten percent, accounted for thirty-six percent of total inflows in 1984. The
United States was the total largest investor, with thirty-five percent of total. Broken up by
sector, banking and finance received fifteen percent, tourism and commerce received eleven
percent, industry received twenty-nine percent, while agriculture, fisheries, and mining com-
bined accounted for only nine percent. Id. at 14.
82. Id.
83. For a more detailed discussion of Spain's investment legislation see Artisien &
Buckley, supra note 69, at 519-523.
84. Echickson, Portugal-Seeking a Path to Modernization, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Feb. 7, 1985 at 13, col. 4.
85. R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 151.
86. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 8.
87. Portugal will have to apply the variable levy to products imported from outside the
Community or the higher Community price for products imported from within the Commu-
nity. The policy will gradually be phased in so that the effects will not be felt all at once.
For details see SPECIAL ENLARGEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 29, at 20-21.
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in 1984.
Portugal's admission to the E.E.C. will further complicate this prob-
lem in the form of an increase in food prices, caused by the imposition of
CAP." Even though wage increases have been promised, it is doubtful
that they will be forthcoming due to the dismal state of the Portuguese
economy.89
Unfortunately, as might be expected with such low wages, most of
the Portuguese work force is either unskilled or semi-skilled, which poses
a problem in attracting the high-tech investment that the country needs.
A new massive training center, financed through the World Bank, is pres-
ently being organized and should help to alleviate this problem.9 0
V. PORTUGUESE WINE INDUSTRY:
E.E.C. AND U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE WAR
Presently, Portugal, as a poor, small country playing a relatively in-
significant role in total world trade, is not directly involved in the
E.E.C.-United States-Japan trade wars. Membership in the Commu-
nity would change this. Portugal will be a member of one of the world's
largest exporting entities and as such will be subject to all the sanctions
imposed against that entity by Japan and the U.S. Of particular impor-
tance to Portugal will be the sanctions that the U.S. imposes against the
Community's wines.
A. Potential U.S. Sanctions Against the Imports of Community Wines
The U.S. and the E.E.C. have been engaged for the past decade in a
trade war over agricultural subsidies. Both sides claim that the subsidies
of the other constitute an unfair practice of world trade and therefore
must be discontinued. Each side has imposed sanctions ranging from quo-
tas to increased duties on certain agricultural products, such as sugar and
wheat.9 ' The E.E.C. fears a move by the U.S. towards the wine industry,
as permitted by the United States Wine Equity and Export Expansion
Act of 1984.92
1. Community Subsidies for Wine
The Community supports the wine industries of member countries in
five significant ways. First, it provides distillation subsidies which enable
producers of wine to sell their lowest utility, surplus bulk wines and by-
88. Foreign Economic Trends: Portugal, supra note 64, at 8.
89. Id.
90. See Boger, The United States-European Community Agricultural Export Subsi-
dies Dispute, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173-238; Dunne, Shall They Beat Their Plow-
shares Into Swords, EUR. 10 (Sept-Oct. 1983); Renshaw, Farm Trade: Tensions Escalate,
EUR. 39 (July-Aug. 1985).
91. Wine Equity and Export Expansion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §10, 98 Stat.
3048, 19 U.S.C. 2801 et. seq.(1984)(hereinafter cited as Wine Equity Act).
92. American Grape Growers Alliance for Trade v. France and Italy, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-
210 and 731-TA-167, USITC Pub. 1502 (1984).
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products to distillers at artificially high prices for conversion to alcohol.
Second, its "intervention program" compensates producers of table wines
for conversion to alcohol. Third, its "export fund" provides subsidies to
exporters to enable them to sell E.E.C wines at a competitive price in
foreign markets; Fourth, it provides grants to grower cooperatives for the
replanting or converting of vineyards to other uses, and for the abandon-
ment of vineyards in locations which are ill-suited for wine production.
Finally, the community provides wine industries with grants for build-
ings, equipment and marketing purposes."
2. Protest by American Grape Growers
In a recent case before the United States International Trade Com-
mission (ITC), the American Grape Growers Alliance (the Alliance) at-
tacked E.E.C.'s subsidies, when applied in conjunction with French and
Italian wine subsidies, as a violation of the anti-dumping provisions of the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1930."4 The Alliance maintained that these subsi-
dies allowed French and Italian wines to sell below the market price in
the United States. In turn, the lower price enabled France and Italy to
sell more wine to American consumers, which displaced sales of domestic
wines. The result was an injury to American grape growers.95
The ITC dismissed the claim for lack of standing, holding that the
Alliance had not shown injury, and in the event injury could have been
proved, there was no causal connection between the injury of the Alliance
and E.E.C.'s wine subsidies. 6
3. Wine Equity and Export Act of 1984
In response to this decision, the United States Congress enacted the
Wine Equity and Export Act of 1984.11 Section 904(b)(3) of the Act spe-
cifically allows producers of "grape products" to initiate complaints
against "each country, or group of foreign countries represented as an ec-
onomic union. . .[that]. . .is a potential significant market for United
States wine, and maintains tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in United
States wine." '98 Thus, under the Act, the Alliance may reintroduce its
complaint against France and Italy, or, as feared by the E.E.C., against
the entire Community.
93. Tariff Act of 1930, Public L. No. 361, 46 Stat. 590, 19 U.S.C. 1001 et. seq. (June 17,
1930)
94. Id.
95. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
96. Id. at §904(b)(3).
97. General Agreement on Trade & Tariff Act (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, part 5, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
98. Grape growers are more likely to lodge a complaint than are wine producers. This is
so because, as a group, grape growers are much more cohesive than wine producers and thus
in a better position to launch a complaint. Moreover, the grape growers, unlike the wine
producers, have not invested in the Community wine industry to any significant degree. See
9 BULL. EUR. COMM. 54-55 (1984); 10 BULL. EUR. COMM. 46 (1984); E.E.C. Asks G.A.T.T. to
Examine U.S. Trade Act, EUR. 46 (Mar.-April 1985).
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The Community's response was that Section 904(b)(3) was in clear
violation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)99 rules
which require that the complaint for an industry alleging injury from un-
fair trade practices be lodged by the producer of the product."'0 Whether
or not this section is in violation of GATT rules is beyond the scope of
this paper; however, if the U.S.-E.E.C. disputes over wheat and sugar
are any example, it is likely that the U.S., acting on the successful com-
plaint of grape growers, will impose anti-dumping and countervailing du-
ties on E.E.C. wines at least until the dispute is resolved.
B. Potential for Attack on the Portuguese Wine Industry
1. As a Wine Exporting Country or as a Member of the E.E.C.
The Wine Equity and Export Act permits petitions against countries,
standing on their own, and against "any group of countries compromising
an economic union."10' It is doubtful that Portugal will be attacked as a
country standing on its own, even after it becomes the recipient of
EAGGF funds.' This is because Portugal produces a relatively small
share, four percent, of total United States wine imports.103 It is unlikely
that the Alliance would launch a petition against Portugal when it did not
launch a similar petition against West Germany, also a recipient of
EAGGF funds and producer of a much greater quantity- seventeen per-
cent-of all United States wine imports.0 4 The two countries which were
attacked, France and Italy, accounted for forty and thirty-four percent of
imports, respectively.10 5
It is more likely that a petition will be launched against the entire
Community and this in turn will effect Portugal as a member. The Wine
Equity and Export Act invites this type of petition. When Congress said
"any group of countries compromising an economic union ' 6 they proba-
bly meant the E.E.C., which is the largest producer of wine in the world.
Three E.E.C. countries, Italy, France, and West Germany, account for
ninety-one percent of all United States wine imports.0 7 With the addi-
tion of Portugal and Spain, this figure will increase to ninety-six per-
cent.'0 8 If the Alliance does reintroduce petitions against foreign wines, it
is difficult to believe that they would not include the Community as at
least one of the defendants, especially in light of the wording of the Act.
99. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
100. Id.
101. American Grape Growers Alliance v. France and Italy, supra note 93, at A-8.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Wine Equity Act, supra note 92.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Macleod, Portugal's Wine-Makers: Coping with Competition, cited in
Bruneau, supra note 5, at 76.
108. Bruneau, supra note 5, at 84.
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2. Effect on Portuguese Economy
Wine is Portugal's leading export. In 1983 the wine industry em-
ployed fifteen percent of the country's work force and earned the country
$200 million dollars in foreign exchange."0 9 United States imports ac-
counted for fourteen percent of this figure. " If petitions are successfully
introduced against the Community or against Portugal, the price of Por-
tuguese wine sold in the U.S. will increase and the demand in Portugal
will lessen. This could severely damage Portugal's economy.
It is possible that the potential decrease in exports to the United
States will be off-set by the amount Portugal receives in subsidies from
the EAGGF. It is also possible that such a petition will not be successful
against Portugal or the Community.
If sanctions are not introduced, the price of Portuguese wine and
port wine sold in the United States would go down, due to the E.E.C.
subsidies for wine, particularly those which allow E.E.C. exports to sell at
competitive world prices. The demand and sale of Portuguese wine, which
is currently higher priced than most European wines sold in the U.S.,
should increase. This would ultimately benefit the Portuguese economy.
VI. EFFECT OF E.E.C.'s GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY
ON PORTUGAL'S TEXTILES
A. Textiles and the Global Mediterranean Policy
The concept of a Global Mediterranean Policy was begun by the
E.E.C. in 1971 in an effort to aid the industrial and social development of
non-E.E.C. Mediterranean countries as well as to provide a way for im-
proving mutual relations between the E.E.C. and these countries."' An
essential element of the global approach was to grant the less developed
Mediterranean countries free access to E.E.C.'s markets. Textiles and
clothing, the most important group of industrial exports of these Mediter-
ranean countries, were allowed into the Common Market at reduced or
zero duties, but subject to certain quantitative restrictions." 2
109. At this time there already existed association agreements between the E.E.C. and
Greece (1961), Turkey (1963), Morocco (1967), Tunisia (1967), Malta (1970), and Cyprus
(1972) as well as free trade agreements with Spain (1970), and Portugal (1972). The object
of the "global approach" was to include the remaining countries in the contractual system of
preferential economic relations. As an outcome the E.E.C. concluded a free trade agreement
with Israel (1975) and cooperation agreements with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia 1976), the Mashrik countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria in 1977) and
Yugoslavia (1980).
110. These concessions were not completely new but had been granted by the E.E.C.'s
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which applied to all developing countries and
came into force on January 1, 1971. See generally Ashoff, The Textile Policy of the Euro-
pean Community Towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and Future Options, 22 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 17 (1983)(hereinafter cited as Ashoff).
111. PROBLEMS OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 29, at A-16.
112. There is the potential for trade diversion resulting in other sectors as well as cloth-
ing and textiles. Portugal's exports to countries outside the E.E.C. closely resemble the
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B. Potential Effects on Portugal's Accession
As a developing Mediterranean country, Portugal was granted con-
cessions and subject to quantitative restrictions for exports of its textiles
and clothing into the Community under the Global Mediterranean Policy.
In view of the upcoming accession, in 1982 the E.E.C. and Portugal nego-
tiated an agreement whereby the quantitative restrictions would gradu-
ally be phased out until four years after the accession date; thus, by 1990
all Portuguese textiles will enter the Community without restriction." s
Other Mediterranean countries fear that a gradual reduction in quotas
will further increase the over-supply within the Community and therefore
lessen the demand for outside products."' Additionally, they expect the
role Portugal will play in the decision-making process to have a detrimen-
tal effect on imports from other developing countries."' These fears could
become reality.
Portugal's textile and clothing industry has consistently held an im-
portant place in the Portuguese economy. In 1980, the industry employed
200,000 workers and accounted for one-tenth of Portugal's gross domestic
product and one-third of the country's entire exports." 6 The Portuguese
have regularly petitioned and received increased quotas from the E.E.C.
due to its special needs. It is reasonable to assume that once a member of
the E.E.C., Portugal will attempt to shape the textile policy according to
its own interests which encompass not only the defense of its own domes-
tic market from cheaper imports, but also protection and expansion of
the market for Portuguese goods within the Community. When the quo-
tas are finally reduced, it is more than probable that the Portuguese
products sold to the Community will work to displace exports from other
Mediterranean countries.
In 1980, total E.E.C. textile and clothing imports from the Mediter-
ranean countries, including Portugal, Spain, and Greece, totaled twenty-
five percent of all textile imports of the E.E.C. Portugal accounted for
one-sixth of this figure, even though only sixty-one percent of Portuguese
textiles and clothing were permitted to enter the Common Market."' If
all other factors were equal and the only drawback to the sale of Portu-
guese clothing and textiles in the Community were the quotas, Portugal
would have been responsible for one-fourth of the total exports from the
sixteen countries." 8 Under this estimate alone, assuming that the E.E.C.
will only import a fixed percentage from various regions, Portugal, with-
out any quotas, could possibly displace one-fourth of all sales by the
E.E.C. imports from low cost non-E.E.C. suppliers. Ashoff, supra note 110, at 34-40; see
generally R.. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 147.
113. Ashoff, supra note 112, at 34-40.
114. R. MORRISON, supra note 4, at 149-50.
115. See Ashoff, supra note 112, at 35-36.
116. Id. at 37.
117. Id.
118. See id. generally, at 37.
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Mediterranean countries, including the one-sixth share which it already
accounts for.
However, this estimate is dependent on several variables. Whether or
not Portuguese exports to the E.E.C will increase as quotas are gradually
reduced is basically dependent on the competitiveness in relation to other
Mediterranean countries. Although future competitiveness is difficult to
measure, three factors are highly indicative of competitiveness in the tex-
tile and clothing industry: (1) wage levels; (2) productivity; and (3) stan-
dards of quality and degree of specialization." 9
1. Wages
In the textile and clothing industry, lower wages are the single most
important variable giving the less developed countries a comparative ad-
vantage. Portugal's wages have been kept competitive with those of other
Mediterranean countries through the devaluation of the escudo and the
decline in real income of workers. 20 Once Portugal joins the E.E.C.,
wages are expected to rise in response to higher food costs.' 2 ' An increase
in wages without a corresponding increase in productivity or quality, will
most likely decrease Portugal's comparative advantage, thus decreasing
its share of exports to the E.E.C.
2. Productivity
Another very important factor in international competitiveness is
productivity. In Portugal, there are approximately thirty firms which are
the sources of all textile and clothing exports. These firms are run with
modern equipment and efficient management and the productivity of
such firms is comparable to similar firms in other textile-exporting coun-
tries.'22 There is no reason to believe that the productivity of these firms
will decline due to accession. If productivity changes at all upon acces-
sion, it will probably improve. Portugal's investment legislation, as well as
eventual free access to the Common Market, may attract new manufac-
turers which are internationally competitive, thus increasing the total
productivity of the industry.
3. Standards of Quality and Degree of Specialization
Comparable information with regard to standards of quality and de-
gree of specialization are difficult to obtain. Because many E.E.C.-based
firms have established major exporting firms in Portugal, these firms usu-
ally meet E.E.C. standards. The exporting national firms generally keep
their standards up to those of the E.E.C.-based firms.' 23 However, it
should be noted that the main attraction of the Portuguese and other
Mediterranean firms is not their quality or innovation, but rather their
inexpensive products. However, an increase in Portugal's quality or spe-
119. See generally supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
120. See Ashoff, supra note 110, at 37.
121. Id. at 38.
122. See PROBLEMS OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 29, at A-16.
123. Ashoff, supra note 112, at 42.
VOL. 15:2,3
PORTUGAL'S ACCESSION INTO THE EEC
cialization,would probably not damage Mediterranean markets, since Por-
tugal would be supplying a new kind of product to a different group of
buyers.
Overall, accession opens possibilities for increased exports of Portu-
guese products to the E.E.C., yet the extent of utilization is dependent
upon the effect of the CAP on Portugal's wages, and the effect of acces-
sion on productivity. Generally, any favorable developments for Portugal
will work to the detriment of third countries. (Cyprus having the greatest
potential damage as both Portugal and Cyprus have concentrated on the
British market.) However, if there is a trade diversion, the impact will be
mitigated by a gradual reduction in tariffs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Economic Detriments to Portugal
Overall, neither Portugal nor the E.E.C. will benefit economically
from the Portuguese membership. Basically both parties will suffer, and
in that respect, Portugal more than the E.E.C. Without steps by the Por-
tuguese government to increase foreign investment, the country's entire
industry will either face the possibility of failing under increased compe-
tition from the Community or will be forced to specialize in peripheral
products. Portugal's exports, such as wine, will be subject to all sanctions
against the E.E.C., even though Portugal poses no threat to international
trade. And the imposition of CAP will cause food costs to rise in the
country, possibly threatening Portugal's comparative wage advantage and
definitely harming the Portuguese consumer. The aid that Portugal will
receive to modernize its farm sector and its industry, as well the gradual
decrease in quotas for textiles, the eventual free movement of workers,
and the entitlement of farmers to the benefits of CAP, will off-set the cost
to Portugal. Nevertheless, this off-set will not be enough to paint a rosy
economic forecast for the Portuguese.
B. Economic Detriments to the Community
Economic consequences to the E.E.C., however do not look as bleak.
It will have to pump funds into Portugal in order to modernize the na-
tion's agricultural sector, and the already burdened Community budget
will need to be further increased. Additionally, member states will gradu-
ally be forced to extend employment benefits to Portuguese workers rap-
idly migrating into the Community. These costs will be off-set by the
opening up of the Portuguese markets to Community's agricultural and
industrial goods, yet overall, the E.E.C. will not benefit economically from
Portugal's membership.
C. Unification of Europe
Without economics as a motivating factor, it can truly be said that
Portugal's membership is a move towards a unified Europe. It demon-
strates the E.E.C.'s willingness to incorporate a small, poor nation into
the Community's union of relatively rich nations merely because that na-
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tion is European and shares in the E.E.C.'s ideals to strengthen peace and
liberty throughout Europe by cooperation among member states.
Portugal's accession also demonstrates that the E.E.C. is still a union
worth joining. Portugal could have survived alone but instead, despite se-
vere effects, it chose to be part of the E.E.C.'s union; a union which car-
ries significant weight in world trade and has the potential of becoming a
formidable political power.

